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Abstract
Existing physical theories do not predict every feature of our expe-
rience but only certain regularities of that experience. That difference
between what could be observed and what can be predicted is one kind
of limit on scientific knowledge. Such limits are inevitable if the world is
complex and the laws governing the regularities of that world are simple.
Another kind of limit on scientific knowledge arises because even sim-
ple theories may require intractable or impossible computations to yield
specific predictions. A third kind of limit concerns our ability to know
theories through the process of induction and test. Quantum cosmology
— that part of science concerned with the quantum origin of the universe
and its subsequent evolution — displays all three kinds of limits. This
paper briefly describes quantum cosmology and discusses these limits.
The place of the other sciences in this most comprehensive of physical
frameworks is described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The assignment of the organizers was to speak on the subject of “limits to scientific
knowledge”. This is not a topic on which I have been forced to reflect a great deal in the
course of my efforts in astrophysics, but I shall try to offer a few thoughts on it from the
perspective of cosmology. Like any assignment, the first task is to understand what it might
mean. I shall say more about this later, but one thing is immediately clear: This is not simply
an empirical question, but rather concerns the relationship between what we observe and
our theories of what we observe. Limits therefore depend on theories and will vary from one
scientific theory to another. The question of what are the fundamental limits to scientific
knowledge must be examined in the most general theoretical context. In physics this is
the subject of quantum cosmology — the quantum mechanics of the universe as a whole
and everything inside it. The nature of scientific knowledge in this most comprehensive of
theories is the subject of this essay. I shall try to describe a little of what quantum cosmology
is about, and address the question of limitations to scientific knowledge in this most general
of contexts.
II. THREE KINDS OF LIMITS TO SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
In this Section three different kinds of limits to scientific knowledge are identified. No
claim is made that these are the only kinds of limits, but these three have a general character
that is inherent in the nature of the scientific enterprise. Subsequent sections will illustrate
these general kinds of limits with examples from quantum cosmology.
A. Limits to What is Predicted
The task of science, as Bohr said, is “to extend the range of our experience and to reduce it
to order” [1]. To reduce experience to order is to compress the length of a description of that
experience. That compression is achieved when a computer program can be exhibited which,
given certain input, outputs a string describing some parts of our experience and the length of
that program together with its input are shorter than the length of the output description.
Theory supplies the program. For instance, a detailed description of the observations of
the positions of the planets over the last 100 years might make up a very long table, but
Newton’s equations of motion can be used to compress all that information into two much
shorter strings: a string stating Newton’s theory and another string giving the positions and
velocities of the planets at one time.
It is a logical possibility that every feature of our experience — the wave function of
every quark, the velocity of every molecule, the position of every leaf, the character of
each biological species, the action of every human, etc. — is just a very long output of
a short computer program with no input. However, in the history of scientific inquiry
there is no evidence that the universe is so regular. Even the most deterministic classical
theories did not claim this. With Newtonian mechanics, Laplace proposed only to predict the
future and retrodict the past given the present position and velocity of each particle in the
universe. That list of initial data would be vastly longer than a few treatises on Newtonian
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mechanics. Existing theories predict a string describing our experience only given some
other, shorter, string as input. Theories do not predict everything that is observed, but only
certain regularities in what is observed. Some things are predicted, some are not, and that
limit to what is predicted is one kind of limit to scientific knowledge.
Scientific laws must have some degree of simplicity to be discoverable, comprehensible,
and effectively applicable by human beings and other complex adaptive systems. If the
complexity of the present universe is large, then this necessary simplicity of the laws implies
that this kind of limit to scientific knowledge is inevitable. Not everything can be predicted
but only those regularities that are summarized in the laws of science. In the following we
shall describe what is predicted and what is not predicted in quantum cosmology.1
B. Limits to Implementation
To be tested, the predictions of an abstractly represented theory covering a broad class
of phenomena must be implemented in particular circumstances. The theory must produce
numbers, and that process involves computation. Even if the laws are precisely specified,
even if the input to those laws is exactly stated, limitations of our ability to compute may
limit our ability to predict. This is another kind of limit to scientific knowledge. The
practical limitations of present computing machines are all too familiar. Computing the
motion of every particle in a classical gas 1022 particles in less than its real evolution time
is well beyond the powers of contemporary computers. However, beyond the limitations of
contemporary machinery, we may ask whether there are fundamental limitations on what
can be computed that are inherent in the form of the laws themselves. The phenomenon
of chaos is the source of one kind of limitation. The precision required of initial data to
extrapolate a given time into the future increases exponentially with that time for a wide
variety of classical systems. Another kind of limit arises in cosmology where resources for
computation, both in time and space, are limited. Further, as we shall see, there is some
evidence that certain predictions of quantum cosmology may be non-computable numbers.
It is not difficult to display predictions which are computationally intractable but which
are measurably inaccessible. Given initial conditions, classical theory predicts the orbits of
every molecule of gas in a room. The explicit computation of this prediction at the operating
speeds of present computers would take much longer than the age of the universe because of
the large number of particles involved. Yet, for the same reason, neither the initial condition
nor the predicted orbits are measurably accessible quantities. Merely exhibiting phenomena
which are impossible or intractable to compute is not much of a limit if the phenomena
are impossible or extraordinarily difficult to measure. The most interesting limits concern
phenomena that are easy to measure but difficult to compute.
1For a lucid discussion in popular language of the notion of complexity and of prediction in
quantum cosmology, as well as a summary of some of the author’s work with M. Gell-Mann, see
[2].
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C. Limits to Verification
The above discussion has assumed that we know the laws of physics. However, we arrive
at those laws by a process of induction and test. Competing laws consistent with known
regularities are winnowed by the process of checking their predictions with new observations.
Are there fundamental limits to what we can test, and therefore fundamental limits to how
well the theory can be known? Cosmology will provide examples.
D. False Limits
Beware of false limits that arise only from imprecise language or the comparison of a
correct theory with an incorrect one. A classic example is provided by the uncertainty
principle in quantum mechanics
∆x∆p ≥ h¯/2 . (2.1)
That relation is sometimes described as a limit on our ability to predict (or “measure” or
“know”) both the position and momentum of a particle at one time to accuracies better than
those restricted by (2.1). However, the uncertainty principle is more accurately characterized
as a limit on the use of classical language in a quantum mechanical situation.
There is no state of a quantum mechanical particle with a precisely defined position and
momentum. That is the content of (2.1). The uncertainty principle, therefore, is not a
limit to what observed properties of quantum particle are predicted by the theory. Since
there is no quantum state with precisely defined position and momentum, quantum theory
predicts that we shall never observe both simultaneously. Thus, as far as the position and
momentum of a particle are concerned, there is no disparity within quantum theory between
what can be predicted and what is observed arising from (2.1) as there would be in the case
of a genuine limit of the type discussed in Section A.
As mentioned earlier, limits to prediction are properties of the theories which specify
what can be predicted. Of course, if we compare two theories one may predict different
phenomena from the other. In classical physics there are states in which the position and
momentum of a particle are simultaneously specified. In quantum theory there are not. But
quantum theory is correct and classical theory incorrect for the domain of phenomena we
have in mind. The uncertainty principle (2.1) may be viewed as a kind of limit to how far
classical concepts and language can be applied in quantum theory, but, were we to strictly
adhere to the language and concepts of quantum theory, it would be no limit at all.
III. DYNAMICAL LAWS AND INITIAL CONDITIONS
As we mentioned above, fundamental limits to what is predicted, to how predictions can
be implemented, and to how theory can be verified depend on what the basic theory is.
This Section sketches some essential features of basic physical theory today. Of course, we
are on dangerous ground here. The most basic laws are often the furthest from definitive
experimental test. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see what kinds of limits might exist in
the kind of basic theoretical framework that is under active investigation by physicists today.
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The most general framework for prediction is quantum cosmology — the quantum theory
of the universe as a whole and everything that goes on inside it. In the following I shall
describe a little of this theory.
Historically, physics for the most part has been concerned with finding dynamical laws
— laws which compress the description of evolution over time to the description of an initial
condition. Thus, these dynamical laws require boundary conditions to yield predictions.
There are no particular laws governing these boundary conditions. They are specified by
our observations of the part of the universe outside the subsystem whose dynamics is of
interest. In a room, if we observe no incoming radiation, we solve Maxwell’s equations there
with no-incoming-radiation boundary conditions. If we prepare an atom in a certain atomic
state we solve Schro¨dinger’s equation with that initial condition, etc.
But in cosmology we are confronted with a fundamentally different kind of problem.
Whether classical or quantum, the dynamical laws governing the evolution of the universe
require boundary conditions. But in cosmology there is no “rest of the universe” to pass
their specification off to. The boundary conditions must be part of the laws of physics
themselves. There is no other place to turn.
A present view, therefore, is that the most general laws of physics involve two elements:
• The laws of dynamics prescribing the evolution of matter and fields and consisting of
a unified theory of the strong, electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational forces.
• A law specifying the initial boundary condition of the universe.
There are no predictions of any kind which do not depend on these two laws, even if only
very weakly, or even when expressed through phenomenological approximations to these
laws (like classical physics) appropriate in particular and limited circumstances with forms
that may be only distantly related to those of the basic theory.
The search for a fundamental theory of the dynamics of matter has been seriously under
way since the time of Newton. Classical mechanics, Newtonian gravity, electrodynamics,
special relativity, general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, the the-
ory of the electroweak interactions, quantum chromodynamics, grand unified theories, and
superstring theory are but some of the important milestones in this search. The search for
a theory of the initial condition of the universe has been seriously under way for not much
more than a decade. (See Ref. [3] for a review.) The reason for this difference can be traced
to the scales on which the regularities summarized by these two laws emerge. The trajec-
tory of a ball in the air, the flow of water in a pipe, or the motion of a planet in the solar
system all exhibit the regularities implied by Newtonian mechanics. The regularities of the
dynamical laws of atomic and particle physics can be exhibited in experiments carried out
in laboratories or large accelerators. However, characteristic regularities implied by a theory
of the initial condition of the universe emerge mostly on much larger, cosmological scales.
On any scale the universe exhibits some regularities in space as distinct from regularities
in time. Rocks on one part of the earth are related to rocks on another part. Similarly,
there are relations between individual members of biological species, and human history in
different locations. These regularities have their origins in the common origin of rocks in the
earth, the evolution of biological species, and the facts of human history. On cosmological
scales the universe is more regular in space than it is on smaller scales. The progress of
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FIG. 1. A sky map of temperature fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation. This figure
may be thought of as a picture of the universe approximately 300,000 years after the big bang. The
hot mixture of matter and radiation that exists immediately after the big bang cools as the universe
expands. About 300,000 years later the universe has cooled enough that matter and radiation no
longer significantly interact. Photons from that time have been traveling freely towards us ever
since. Their characteristic temperature now is only 2.7 degrees above absolute zero, yet they can
be detected at microwave wavelengths by sensitive instruments. The figure above shows a sky map
of the temperature of that radiation based on data taken with the COBE satellite. The dark spots
are where the sky is cooler than the mean temperature and the white areas are where it is hotter.
The differences in temperature between the darkest black and the whitest while it is only a few
hundred micro degrees Kelvin. The universe is thus essentially featureless at 300,000 years after
the big bang except for these tiny fluctuations. These small fluctuations, however, are the origin
of all the complexity in the universe that we see today. [Greyscale adaptation by J. Gundersen of
the results of C. Bennett, et. al. Ap. J., 436, 423 (1994)]
observation in astronomy in recent decades has given us an increasingly detailed picture of
the universe on ever larger scales of space and time. The remarkable inference from these
observations is that the universe becomes increasingly simple as we move to larger scales
in space and more distant times in the past. Galaxies are not very complicated objects
but still exhibit a variety of types and considerable individuality. On the larger scale of a
tenth of the radius of the universe the galaxies are no longer individual objects, but there is
considerable structure in their distribution. Pictures of the distribution of galaxies on the
sky, which probe out to greater distances show less structure. On the largest scales, the
distribution of the cosmic background radiation temperature, which is as close as we can
come to a picture of the universe three hundred thousand years after the big bang, reveals
almost no structure at all. (See Figure 1.) The deviations in this temperature from exact
smoothness (exact isotropy) are measured in tens of millionths of a degree. However, those
deviations are important! They are the origin of all the complexity in the universe we see
today. As the universe evolves, these fluctuations grow, collapse, and fragment through
gravitational attraction to become the galaxies, stars, and planets which characterize the
universe today. Initially very close to equilibrium, the matter in the universe is thereby
driven further from equilibrium. That disequilibrium is necessary for chemistry, geology,
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life, biology, and human history.
The evidence of the observations then is that the universe was a simpler place earlier
than it is now — more homogeneous, more isotropic, with matter more nearly in thermal
equilibrium. The aim of quantum cosmology is a quantum theory of this simple initial
condition.
IV. CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM INITIAL CONDITIONS
It is an inescapable inference from the physics of the last sixty years that we live in
a quantum mechanical universe — a world in which the basic laws of physics conform to
that general framework for prediction we call quantum mechanics. We perhaps have little
evidence for peculiarly quantum mechanical phenomena on large and even familiar scales,
but there is no evidence that the phenomena that we do see cannot be described in quantum
mechanical terms and explained by quantum mechanical laws. This is the first reason that
the search for a theory of the initial condition is carried out in the framework of quantum
cosmology. There is, however, another reason: quantum indeterminacy is probably necessary
for a comprehensible basic, scientific theory of the initial condition.
To explain this necessity and also to understand a bit of the machinery of quantum
cosmology, consider a model universe. Suppose the universe consists of a box the size of the
visible universe containing a large number N of particles interacting by fixed potentials. To
simulate the expansion of the universe we could let the box expand. That’s actually not a
bad model for what goes on in more recent epochs of the universe.
Classically a history of this model universe is a curve in a 6N dimensional phase space of
the positions and momenta of all the particles in the box. Classical evolution is deterministic
— if the point in phase space specifying the system’s configuration is known at one time,
the location at all other times is determined by the equations of motion. A classical theory
of the initial condition of the model universe thus might specify the initial point in phase
space at t = 0. However, such a theory would necessarily be hopelessly complex because it
would have to encode all the complexity we see today. Its description would be too long to
be comprehensible.
A statistical classical initial condition could be simpler. Such an initial condition would
only give a probability for the initial point in phase space and therefore only a probability for
the subsequent evolution. Present predictions of the future would then be probabilistic. For
example, observers at any time in the history of the universe can only see galaxies within a
distance close enough that their light could have reached them in the time since the big bang.
This cosmological horizon expands as the universe ages. One new galaxy comes over this
cosmological horizon approximately every 10 minutes. A statistical initial condition might
not predict with near certainty, say, the specific locations of the individual new galaxies, but
rather their statistical distribution on the sky. Similarly, with a classical initial condition in
which matter was initially in thermal equilibrium, one might predict the overall intensity of
the background radiation on the sky, but not the location of any particular fluctuation in
its intensity.
Probabilities in classical physics reflect ignorance. A classical statistical law of the initial
condition would mean that we have some information about how the universe started out,
but not all. However, we learn from observation. With every observation we could refine our
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theory of the initial condition which would therefore become increasingly complex, reflecting
the complexity of the present, and thus become increasingly less comprehensible.
Quantum mechanics is inherently indeterministic and probabilities are basic. The most
complete specification of the initial state of our model box of particles would be a wave
function on the configuration space of all their positions
Ψ (~x1, · · · , ~xN) (4.1)
— a wave function of the universe for this model. Unlike classical physics, subsequent
observation will not improve this initial condition, although the results of observation can
be used to improve future predictions. Thus, in quantum mechanics, it is natural to have a
simple, comprehensible law of the initial condition which is consistent with the complexity
observed today.2
V. WHAT IS PREDICTED IN QUANTUM COSMOLOGY?
My colleague, Murray Gell-Mann, once asked me, “If you know the wave function of the
universe, why aren’t you rich?” The answer is that very little is predicted with certainty by
such a quantum initial condition of the universe and certainly not of much use in generating
wealth. What might be predicted by an initial condition for cosmology is the subject of this
Section.
Quantum mechanics predicts probabilities for sets of alternatives. In our model universe
in a box, for example, it might predict the probabilities for alternative ranges of the position
of a particle at a particular time, or the probabilities for alternative distributions of energy
density in the box, and many other sets of alternatives. These are the probabilities for
alternatives which are single events in a single closed system — the universe as a whole.
What do such probabilities of single events mean? Some may find it helpful to think of
these probabilities as predictions of relative frequencies in an imaginary infinite ensemble
of universes, but they are not frequencies in any accessible sense. Rather, to understand
what the probabilities of single events mean it is best to understand how they are used.
Probabilities of single events can be useful guides to behavior even when they are distributed
over a set of alternatives so that none is very close to zero or one. Examples are the
probability that it will rain today or the probability of a successful marriage. However,
because the probabilities are distributed, the event which occurs — rain or no rain, divorce
or death before parting — does not test the theory that produced the probabilities. Tests of
the theory occur when the probabilities are near certain, by which I mean sufficiently close to
zero or one that the theory would be falsified if an event with probability sufficiently close to
zero occurred, or an event with a probability sufficiently close to one did not occur.3 Various
strategies can be used to identify sets of alternatives for which probabilities are near zero or
2For an early statement of this, see [4].
3How close to zero or one probabilities must be for near certain predictions depends on the
circumstances in which they are used as I have discussed elsewhere [5].
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one. The most familiar is to study the frequencies of outcomes of repeated observations in an
ensemble of a large number of identical situations. Such frequencies would be predicted with
certainty in an infinite ensemble. However, since there are no genuinely infinite ensembles
in the world, we are necessarily concerned with the probability for the deviations of the
frequency in a finite ensemble from the expected behavior of an infinite one. Those are
probabilities for single properties (the deviations) of a single system (the whole ensemble)
that become closer and closer to zero or one as the ensemble is made larger.
Another strategy to identify alternatives with probabilities near zero and one is to con-
sider probabilities conditioned on other information besides that given in the theory of
dynamics and the initial condition of the universe. Present theories of the initial condition
do not predict the observed orbit of Mars about the sun with any significant probability. But
they do predict that the conditional probability for the observed orbit is near one given a few
previous observations of Mars’ position. Such conditional probabilities are what are used in
the rest of the sciences when they are viewed from the perspective of quantum cosmology
as we shall discuss in more detail in the subsequent Sections.
In the following discussion it will be helpful to use just a little of the mathematics of
quantum mechanics to discuss quantum cosmology.4 For simplicity and definiteness let us
continue to discuss the model universe of N particles in a box. The quantum initial state of
this model universe is represented by a state vector |Ψ〉 in a Hilbert space, or equivalently
by a wave function of the coo¨rdinates of all the particles in the box:
Ψ (~x1, · · · , ~xN) . (5.1)
General alternatives at a moment of time whose probabilities we might want to consider
can always be reduced to a set of “yes-no” alternatives. For instance, questions about the
position of a particle can be reduced to questions of the form: “Is the particle in this region —
yes or no?”, “Is the particle in that region — yes or no?”, etc. A set of “yes-no” alternatives
at one moment of time, say t = 0, is represented by a set of orthogonal projection operators
{Pα}, α = 1, 2, · · · — one projection operator for each alternative. (A projection operator
is one whose square is equal to itself.) The projection operators satisfy
∑
α
Pα = I , and PαPβ = 0 , α 6= β , (5.2)
showing mathematically that they represent an exhaustive set of exclusive alternatives. The
same set of alternatives at a later time t is represented by a set of (Heisenberg picture)
projection operators {Pα(t)}. The time dependence of each Pα(t) is given by
Pα(t) = e
iHtPαe
−iHt (5.3)
where H is the Hamiltonian encapsulating the basic dynamical theory. The probability
predicted for alternative α at time t is
p(α) = ‖Pα(t)|Ψ〉‖
2 , (5.4)
4For more details at an elementary level see [6] and in greater depth see [7].
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where ‖ · ‖ means the length of the Hilbert space vector inside. For this model, the Hamilto-
nian H specifies the first of the two elements of a basic physical theory described in Section
III — the fundamental theory of dynamics. The state vector |Ψ〉 or equivalently the wave
function Ψ(~x1, · · ·~xn) specifies the second element — the initial condition.
Probabilities for alternatives at a moment of time are not the most general predictions
of quantum mechanics. More generally, one can ask for the probabilities of sequences of sets
of alternatives at a series of different times t1 < t2 < · · · < tn making up a set of alternative
histories for the universe. Each history corresponds to a particular sequence of alternatives
(α1, · · · , αn) and is represented by an operator that is the chain of projections corresponding
to the sequence of alternatives
Cα = P
n
αn
(tn) · · ·P
1
α1
(t1) . (5.5)
Here, the index α is shorthand for the whole sequence (αn, · · · , α1) and the superscripts
on the P ’s indicate that different sets of alternatives can be considered at different times.
When the operator Cα is applied to the initial state vector |Ψ〉, one obtains the branch state
vector Cα|Ψ〉 corresponding to the history α. The probability of the history α is the length
of the history’s branch state vector:
p(α) = ‖Cα|Ψ〉‖
2 . (5.6)
Probabilities of histories are essential for predicting such everyday things as the orbit of the
moon, which is a sequence of positions at a series of times.
We can now begin to analyze the question of what is predicted in quantum cosmology
and what is not predicted. The most characteristically quantum mechanical limitation on
what can be predicted is that not every set of alternative histories that may be described can
be assigned probabilities by the theory because of quantum mechanical interference. That is
very clearly exemplified in the two-slit thought experiment illustrated in Figure 2. Electrons
proceed from an electron gun through a barrier with two slits on their way to detection at
a screen. Passing through slit A or slit B defines two alternative histories for the electrons
arriving at a fixed point y on the screen. In the usual story if we have not measured which
slit an electron passed through, then it would be inconsistent to predict probabilities for
these alternative histories. It would be inconsistent because the probability to arrive at y
would not be the sum of the probability to pass through A to y and the probability to pass
through B to y:
p(y) 6= pA(y) + pB(y) . (5.7)
That is because in quantum mechanics probabilities are the squares of amplitudes and
|ψA(y) + ψB(y)|
2 6= |ψA(y)|
2 + |ψB(y)|
2 . (5.8)
It is not that we are ignorant of which slit an electron passes through, so that the
probabilities are 50–50. It is inconsistent to discuss probabilities at all.
Quantum mechanics, in any of its various levels of formulation, therefore contains a rule
specifying which sets of alternative histories may be assigned probabilities and which may
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FIG. 2. The two-slit experiment. An electron gun at left emits an electron traveling towards
detection at a screen at right, its progress in space recapitulating its evolution in time. In between
there is a barrier with two slits. Two possible histories of an electron arriving at a particular point
on the screen are defined by whether it went through slit A or slit B. In quantum mechanics,
probabilities cannot be consistently assigned to this set of two alternative histories because of
quantum mechanical interference between them. However, if the electron interacts with apparatus
that measures which of the slits it passed through, then interference is destroyed, the alternative
histories decohere, and probabilities can be assigned to the alternative histories.
not. In the most general context of the quantum mechanics of the universe that rule is
as follows [8,9,10]: Probabilities may be consistently assigned to just those sets of histories
for which there is vanishing interference between the individual members of the set as a
consequence of the universe’s initial state |Ψ〉. Such sets of histories are said to decohere.
The condition for a decoherent set of histories is that the branches of the initial state Cα|Ψ〉
corresponding to individual histories be mutually orthogonal:
〈Ψ|C†α · Cβ|Ψ〉 ≈ 0 , α 6= β . (5.9)
The most general probability sum rules are satisfied as a consequence. Consistency limits the
predictions of quantum theory to the probabilities of decoherent sets of alternative histories.
As an example of how the decoherence of a set of histories comes about, think about a
single millimeter-sized dust grain in a quantum state that is a superposition of two positions
about a millimeter apart located deep in intergalactic space. Consider alternative histories
of the position of this particle at a sequence of a few times. (The P ’s in (5.5) would then be
projections onto ranges of this position.) Were the particle isolated, this situation would be
analogous to the two-slit experiment, and histories of differing positions would not decohere.
However, even deep in space this particle is not isolated. The all-pervasive light from the
big bang illuminates the particle, and about 1011 cosmic background photons scatter from
it every second. Through these interactions, this seemingly isolated dust grain becomes
correlated with radiation in a part of the universe whose size is growing at the speed of
light. The two states with different positions become correlated with two different, nearly
11
orthogonal states of the radiation after a time of about a nanosecond. By this means, a
branch of the initial state in which the grain is initially at one position becomes orthogonal
to a branch in which the grain is a millimeter away. Decoherence of alternative histories of
position has been achieved because the relative phase between states of different position
has been dissipated by feeble interactions with the background radiation. Mechanisms such
this are widespread in the universe and typical of those effecting the decoherence of histories
of the kinds of classical variables we like to follow. (See, e.g. [11,12])
In the above example, decoherence of alternative histories of the position of the dust
grain is achieved at the cost of ignoring the photons that are effecting the decoherence.
That is an example of coarse-graining. Were we to consider a set of alternative histories of
states of the cosmic background radiation as well as the position of the grain we would be,
in effect, following all possible phase information. Such a set of alternative histories would
generally not decohere. Except for trivial cases, sets of histories must describe coarse-grained
alternatives in order for probabilities to be predicted at all. This necessary imprecision is a
genuine limit to what can be predicted in quantum cosmology, in contrast to the limits of the
kind associated with the uncertainty principle which are merely limits to the applicability
of classical modes of description.5
We thus have the picture of a vast class of all possible sets of alternative histories and a
smaller subclass of decoherent sets of histories for which quantum theory predicts probabil-
ities. For almost none of these decoherent sets is there a history predicted with certainty on
the basis of the initial state alone. If one history has probability one, then all alternatives
to it must have probability zero. Suppose we have such a set, and let αc be the label of the
certain history, then from (5.6)
‖Cα|Ψ〉‖
2 = 0 , α 6= αc , (5.10)
which implies
Cα|Ψ〉 = 0 , α 6= αc . (5.11a)
Then, since ΣαCα = I as a consequence of (5.2), we also have
Cα|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 , α = αc . (5.11b)
Decoherence , eq. (5.9), is then automatic for such sets of histories in which one is certain.
5Decoherence also implies another kind of limit to classical predictability which should be men-
tioned although we cannot discuss it in any depth here. As described, realistic mechanisms of deco-
herence involve the dispersal of phase information concerning a subsystem into an environment that
interacts feebly with it. Those interactions produce noise which limits the classical predictability
of the subsystem. Thus, for classical predictability appropriate and sufficient coarse-graining is
needed for the decoherence necessary to predict probabilities at all. But further coarse-graining
is needed for the subsystem to have sufficient inertia to resist the noise that those mechanisms of
decoherence produce and thereby become classically predictable. (For an introductory discussions
see [13]. For a more detailed one see [7].)
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Eq. (5.11b) shows that operators of histories that are predicted with certainty act as
projection operators on the initial state. An alternative predicted with probability one
is thus mathematically equivalent to the alternative corresponding to the question “Is the
universe in state |Ψ〉”? These are very special questions. Out of the class of sets of decoherent
histories almost none correspond to sets in which one history is a certain prediction of the
initial condition and the theory of dynamics alone.
In quantum cosmology we might hope that some gross features of the universe might be
among those that are predicted with near certainty from the initial condition and dynamics
alone. These include features such as the approximate homogeneity and isotropy of the
universe on scales above several hundred megaparsecs6, its vast age after the big bang
when measured on elementary particle time scales, and certain features of the spectrum of
density fluctuations that grew to produce the galaxies. On more familiar scales we may hope
that the laws of the initial condition and dynamics would predict the homogeneity of the
thermodynamic arrow of time and the wide range of scale and epoch on which the regularities
of classical physics are exhibited. There has even been speculation that phenomena on very
small scales, such as the dimensionality of spacetime or certain effective interactions of the
elementary particles at accessible energy scales, may be near certain predictions of the initial
condition and dynamics. But there is little reason to suspect that a simple theories of the
initial condition and fundamental dynamics will predict anything about the behavior of the
New York stock market with near certainty and a great many other interesting phenomena
as well. That is why you can’t get rich knowing the wave function of the universe!
The situation is very different if information beyond laws of dynamics and the initial
condition is supplied and probabilities conditioned on that information are considered. There
are many sets of conditional probabilities in which one member of the set is near certain.
These conditional probabilities are the basis of prediction in all the other sciences when
viewed from the perspective of quantum cosmology as will be described in the next Section.
I have described various limitations on what can be predicted in quantum cosmology. Yet
there is a sense in which we, as information gathering and utilizing physical systems, make
use of only a small part of the possible predictions of quantum cosmology. That is because of
our almost exclusive focus on alternatives defined in terms of the variables of classical physics
— averages over suitable volumes of densities of energy and momentum, densities of nuclear
and chemical species, average field strengths, etc. Such classical quantities are represented by
quantum operators called quasiclassical operators. ( They are termed quasiclassical because
they do not behave classically in all circumstances.) Certainly our immediate experience
can be described in terms of quasiclassical variables even when — as in the clicks of a Geiger
counter — these variables do not obey deterministic classical laws.
Even in our theorizing about regions of space or epochs in time that are very distant
from us, we often focus on histories of alternatives of quasiclassical operators. Only in the
microscopic arena do we consider non-quasiclassical alternatives such as election spin and
coherent superpositions of position. Even then we typically consider such alternatives only
when they are tightly correlated with a quasiclassical variable as in a measurement situation.
6A megaparsec (Mpc) is a convenient unit for cosmology. One megaparsec = 3.3 million light years
= 3.1× 1024cm. The size of the universe visible today is of order several thousand megaparsecs.
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However, quantum field theory exhibits many more kinds of variables than the small set
of quasiclassical ones. Decohering sets of histories can be constructed from alternative values
of non-quasiclassical operators as well as from quasiclassical ones. Indeed, the quasiclassical
sets of histories are but a small subset of the whole class of decohering histories. Quantum
theory does not privilege one set of decohering histories over another. Probabilities are
predicted for all such sets of alternatives. Histories of non-quasiclassical alternatives are not
beyond reach. Suppose we were to make measurements of peculiarly quantum mechanical
variables involving large numbers of particles in regions of macroscopic dimensions. The
histories that would be relevant for the explanation of the outcomes of these measurements
would not be histories of quasiclassical variables in these regions, but rather histories of
the non-quasiclassical alternatives that were measured. The reason for our preference for
quasiclassical sets of alternative histories, like all other questions concerning ourselves as
particular physical systems, probably lies in our evolutionary history — not in the framework
of quantum theory itself.
VI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SCIENCES
Using the conditional probabilities of quantum cosmology, a particular orbit of the earth
about the sun could be predicted with near certainty given a few previous positions of
the earth and a description of the earth and solar system in terms of the fundamental
fields which are the language of quantum cosmology. The probabilities for the outcome of
chemical reactions become near certain predictions of quantum cosmology given a description
in terms of fundamental fields of the molecules involved and the conditions under which they
interact. The probabilities for the behavior of sea turtles in particular environments could,
in principle, become predictions of quantum cosmology given a description of sea turtles and
their environments in the language of quantum cosmology. Even the probabilities for the
different behaviors of human — beings both individually and collectively — could in principle
be predicted given a sufficiently accurate description of the individuals, their history, their
environment, and their possible modes of behavior. In this way every prediction in science
could be viewed in terms of a conditional probability in quantum cosmology. Why then do we
have separate sciences of astronomy, chemistry, biology, psychology, and so on? The answer,
of course, is that it is neither especially interesting nor practical to reduce the predictions
of these sciences to a computation in quantum cosmology.
One measure of the difference between the sciences is how sensitive the regularities they
study are to the forms of the initial condition of the universe and the fundamental theory
of dynamics. The phenomena studied in chemistry, fluid mechanics, geology, biology, psy-
chology, and human history, depend only very little on the particular form of the initial
condition. All of these sciences, especially chemistry, depend on the form of the theory of
dynamics in some approximation, but as we move through the list we are moving towards
in the direction of the study of the regularities of increasingly specific subsystems of the
universe. Specific subsystems can exhibit more regularities than are implied generally by
the laws of dynamics and the initial condition. The explanation of these regularities lies in
the origin and evolution of the specific subsystems in question. Naturally these regularities
are more sensitive to this specific history than they are to the form of the initial condition
and dynamics. That is especially clear in a science like biology. Of course, living systems
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TABLE I. Some Differences Between the Sciences
Length of Coarse-grained Length of Coarse-grained Length of Computation of
Description of Alternatives Description of Conditions Conditional Probabilities
Classical Physics Very Short Short Very Short
Astronomy Short Short Short — Long
Fluid Mechanics Short — Long Short Short — Long
Chemistry Short — Long Short — Long Long — Very Long
Geology Long Long Long
Biology Long — Very Long Long — Very Long Long — Very Long
Psychology Very Long Very Long Very, Very Long(?)
conform to the laws of physics and chemistry, but their detailed form and behavior depend
much more on the frozen accidents of several billion years of evolutionary history on a partic-
ular planet moving around a particular star than they do on the details of superstring theory
or the “no-boundary” initial condition of the universe.7 Conversely the phenomena studied
by these sciences do not help much in discriminating among different theories of the initial
condition and dynamics. It is for such reasons that it is not of pressing interest — either for
other areas of science or for quantum cosmology itself — to express the predictions of such
phenomena as quantum cosmological probabilities, even though it is in principle possible to
do so.
Even if we were to wish to carry out a calculation of the conditional probabilities in
quantum cosmology necessary for prediction in the other sciences, an examination of what
it would take yields three measures which distinguish the other sciences from quantum
cosmology and from one another. To yield a conditional probability the theory requires:
• A description of the coarse-grained alternatives whose probabilities are to be predicted
in terms of fundamental quantum fields.
• A description of the circumstances on which the probabilities are conditioned in terms
of fundamental quantum fields.
• A computation of the conditional probabilities.
The table above shows some simplistic guesses of the lengths of these three parameters
for typical problems in the various sciences. We can discuss a few of these:
By classical physics I simply mean Newton’s laws of mechanics and gravity, the laws of
continuum mechanics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics, the laws of thermodynamics, etc. — in
short, the basic laws of physics as they were formulated in the 19th century. (I do not mean
some specific application of these laws, as to the breaking of ocean waves.) Classical physics
might almost be counted as a science separate from physics, for the laws of classical physics
7See, e.g. [2] for more discussion in greater depth and examples from this point of view.
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do not hold universally, but only for certain kinds of subsystems in particular circumstances.
However, the table shows the reason these laws are usually considered part of the science
of physics. There is just a short list of quasiclassical variables (volume averages of fields,
densities of energy, momentum, chemical composition, etc.) whose ranges of values define
the coarse-grained alternatives of classical physics [7]. It is a somewhat longer business to
spell out, in quantum mechanical terms, the circumstances in which classical physics applies.
But the derivation of the laws of classical physics can be as short as a journal paper.8
As we move down the table to astronomy we encounter more specific classes of phys-
ical systems — stars, clusters, galaxies, etc. However, the difficulty of obtaining data on
such distant objects prevents us from learning much individual detail. The length of the
coarse-grained descriptions of both conditions and alternatives are typically short. The
computations utilizing the equations of classical physics, however, range from very short
dimensional estimates to long simulations of supernovae explosions.
In fluid mechanics we encounter a wide variety of particular phenomena arising from
differential equations of classical physics. One has only to mention laminar flow, turbulence,
cavitation, percolation, convection, solitons, shock waves, detonation, superfluidity, clouds,
dynamos, internal waves, ocean waves, the weather, etc., to recall something of the richness
of phenomena studied in this subject. The coarse-grainings describing the alternative be-
haviors of fluids can sometimes be long although the description of the conditions is usually
shorter. Many of these phenomena can be simulated on computers today by solving the dif-
ferential equations of classical physics. These calculations could be considered calculations
in quantum cosmology were we to append to them a standard description of the alternatives
and conditions, together with the computations that justify the use of these approximate
equations in terms of the fundamental theory of quantum fields and the initial condition.
The description of the molecules of interest in chemistry can vary from short — as in
typical chemical formulae — to long — as in the base sequence in human DNA. There is a
similar range of conditions for chemical reactions ranging from a few reagents in a test tube
to the interiors of cells. Quantum chemists can compute certain chemical properties such as
the those of chemical bonds directly from the equations of an effective low-energy theory of
the elementary particles but these computations can only be described as long.
In geology we have a science concerned with a very specific system — the earth —
observed in considerable detail. A lengthy string is needed to describe the alternative con-
figurations and composition of the material on the surface in the detail that we know it. A
long history would have to be described to set the conditions for calculating the probabilities
and calculations of these probabilities, even assuming the laws of classical physics, would be
very long.
The reader probably needs little convincing that the description of the behavior of a
complex biological organism plus its evolutionary history and its present environment in
the language of quantum field theory would be a long business indeed! We should not
pretend that we are anywhere close to being able to give such a description or to being able
to carry out the relevant computations of conditional probabilities in quantum cosmology.
Psychology and human history are yet more difficult. We may have a rough idea of how
8For a one-journal-paper derivation from the quantum cosmological point of view see, e.g. Ref. [7].
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to describe the action of a bird’s beak in the language of quantum field theory, but very
little idea of the coarse grainings that describe an individuals thoughts and emotions or the
vissitudes of empires.
Dear reader, please do not write the author concerning the inadequacies of the above
discussion. He is aware that the boundaries between the sciences are not precisely defined
and that there is wide variation in these three parameters within each one. In astronomy,
for example, the description of our nearest star — the sun — can be just as complex as
that of any phenomena in fluid mechanics (and indeed is a part of fluid mechanics). The
smallest self-reproducing biological units may be simulable by conceivable computers [14].
There may be universal principles of mind which derive rather directly from the basics of
physics [15]. The important point is, that at a basic level, every prediction in science may be
viewed as the prediction of a conditional probability for alternatives in quantum cosmology
and that the probabilities relevant to different sciences may be distinguished, in part, by
their sensitivity to the theories of the initial condition and dynamics, by the length of the
description of the alternatives, by the length of the description of the conditions, and by the
length of the computation needed to produce them.
VII. LIMITS TO IMPLEMENTATION
The preceding Section discussed some limitations of practice in our effort to implement
the predictions of quantum cosmology for interesting specific subsystems in the universe.
These limits were of the general character described in Section IIB. Are there more funda-
mental and general limits arising from computational intractability? Quantum cosmology
provides some examples.
There are physical reasons for computational intractability and mathematical ones. Lan-
dauer [16] has raised the issue of whether there are predictions whose computation would
require more resources of space, material, and time than are available in the universe. Quan-
tum cosmology may also present an example of what might be regarded as an extreme ex-
ample of mathematical computational intractability. There is some evidence that the wave
function of the universe might be non-computable in the technical mathematical sense.
One idea for a theory of the wave function of the universe is the “no-boundary” proposal
[17]. To understand a little of this idea assume, for simplicity, that the universe is spatially
closed and that gravity is the only quantum field. A cosmological wave function is then
a function of the the possible geometries of three-dimensional space. The “no-boundary”
idea is that the value of the wave function of the universe Ψ at one particular spatial
geometry is a sum over all locally Euclidean four-dimensional geometries which have this
three-dimensional space as a boundary and no other boundaries. Each four-dimensional
geometry G in the sum is weighted by exp (−I[G]) where I[G] is the classical action for the
geometry. Mathematically a geometry is a specification of a notion of distance (a metric)
on a space such that any small region can be smoothly mapped into a to a region of flat
Euclidean space ( a manifold). A sum over geometries would therefore naturally include a
sum over manifolds as well as a sum over metrics. By suppressing two of the four dimensions
we can give a crude pictorial representation of this double sum as shown in Figure 3.
The mathematics of quantum gravity has not been developed to the point that we have
a precise mathematical formulation of what the relation schematically represented in Figure
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FIG. 3. The wave function of the universe as a sum over manifolds and metrics. This figure
uses two-dimensional analogs to illustrate some of the ideas that enter into the construction of the
“no-boundary” wave function of the universe. That wave function is a function of three-dimensional
spatial geometries one of which is represented here in two fewer dimensions by the heavy circular
curve. For that given three-geometry, the “no-boundary” wave function is a sum over Euclidean
four-geometries that have it as one boundary and no other boundary. This sum can be divided
into a sum over four-manifolds and a sum over different four-metrics on those manifolds. The
two-dimensional analog of this sum is shown above. The surfaces in each column represent different
metrics on the same manifold. The manifolds in each column are the same because the surfaces
can be smoothly deformed into one another by changing their shape. The metrics are different
from one surface to another in a given column because the distance between two points is generally
different from one shape to another. For example, the overall surface area may differ from one
shape to another. The two-dimensional surfaces in different columns are different manifolds because
they have different numbers of handles, and surfaces with different number of handles cannot be
smoothly deformed into one another. A sum over manifolds is thus analogous to the sum over
columns. A sum over metrics is analogous to the sum over different surfaces in each column.
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3 might mean. One idea for making it precise is to approximate each term in the sum by
a manifold constructed of flat four-simplices — the four-dimensional analogs of triangles in
two-dimensions and tetrahedra in three-dimensions. The two-dimensional analog of such a
simplicial manifold would be a surface made up of triangles like a geodesic dome as illustrated
in Figure 4. To calculate in four-dimensions the sum crudely pictured in Figure 3 one would
proceed as follows: Choose a large number of four-simplices N . Find all possible manifolds
that can be made by joining these four-simplices together. Choose one such assembly to
represent each manifold in the sum. Integrate exp (−I[G]) over the edge lengths of the
simplices that are compatible with the triangle and similar inequalities to approximate the
sum over metrics. Sum the result over all manifolds. Take the limit as N →∞. That is one
possible way the sum over geometries in the “no boundary” proposal for the wave function
of the universe might be implemented.9
A computer program to carry out this task would first have to try all possible ways of
assembling N four-simplices together and reject those which do not give a manifold. This
is already a formidable mathematical problem and it has only been recently proven that
an algorithm exists to carry out this computation for four-dimensional manifolds [19,20].
The next step would be for the computer to take this list of four-manifolds and eliminate
duplications. However, it is known that the issue of whether two simplicial four-manifolds are
identical is undecidable.10 More precisely, there does not exist a computer program which,
for any N , can compare two input assemblies of N four-simplices making up manifolds, and
halt after having printed out “yes” if the manifolds are identical and “no” if they are not.
This suggests that the wave function of the universe defined by a sum over geometries
that includes a sum over manifolds is a non-computable number.11 However, appearances
can be deceptive. Whether a number is non-computable or not is a property of the number
and not of the way it is represented. Merely exhibiting one non-computable representation
like the series in Figure 3 does not establish that there is not some other representation in
which it is computable. Demonstrating non-computability in such cases is likely to be a
difficult mathematical problem.
This suggested non-computability of sums over topologies has been taken as motivation
for modifying the theory of the initial condition so that it is clearly computable [22,23]. But
suppose that the wave function of the universe were non-computable. What would be the
implications for science? Bob Geroch and I analyzed the implications of non-computability
for physics in 1986 [24]. Our conclusion was that the prediction of non-computable numbers
would not be a disaster for physics. That is because at any one time one needs theoretical
predictions only to an accuracy consistent with experimental possibilities. Suppose, for
example, it was sufficient for comparison with present observations to know the wave function
of the universe to an accuracy of 10%. Suppose further it could be shown that to achieve
this accuracy only simplicial manifolds with less than 100 four-simplices need be included
9For more details and references to the earlier literature see, e.g. Ref. [18].
10For a review see [21].
11We are specifically assuming the Turing model of computability.
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FIG. 4. A smooth two-dimensional surface may be approximated by an assembly of flat tri-
angles like a geodesic dome. In an analogous way, a curved four-dimensional geometry may be
approximated by an assembly of four-simplices — the four dimensional analog of two-dimensional
triangles or three-dimensional tetrahedra. The four-simplices must be assembled so as to make a
manifold — a space such that any small region can be smoothly mapped to a region of Euclidean
space. Suppose we are given N four-simplices. Assembling them in different ways can give different
manifolds (the different vertical columns in Figure 3). Different assignments of lengths to the edges
give different sizes and shapes on a given manifold, that is, a different metric (the different shapes
within each column in Figure 3). A sum over geometries, which is a sum over manifolds and met-
rics, may therefore be approximated by choosing one assembly to represent each manifold in the
sum, integrating over its possible edge-lengths, and summing over all manifolds. The resulting sum
may be a non-computable number because there is no algorithm for deciding when two simplicial
four-manifolds are identical.
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in the series defining the wave function. The theorem concerning the non-existence of an
algorithm for deciding the identity of simplicial four-manifolds refers to an algorithm that
would work for any N . It does not rule out establishing the identity of two four-manifolds
with less than 100 four-simplices. Indeed, being a problem that involves a finite number of
specific cases, one imagines it could be solved with sufficient work on those cases. What the
theorem ensures is that, if observations improve, and the wave function is later needed to
an accuracy of 1%, requiring manifolds with a larger number of four-simplices (say 10,000),
a new intellectual effort will be required to compute it. The algorithms that worked for
manifolds assembled from less than 100 four-simplices are unlikely to work for manifolds
assembled from less than 10,000 four-simplices.
Thus, the prediction of non-computable numbers would not mean the end of compar-
ison between theory and observation. It would mean that the process of computing the
predictions could be as conceptually challenging a problem as posing the theory itself.
VIII. LIMITS TO VERIFICATION
Quantum mechanics predicts the probabilities of alternative histories of the universe.
We cannot interpret these probabilities as predictions of frequencies which are accessible to
test, for we have access to but a single universe and but a single history of it. Our ability
to test the theory or to infer the theory from empirical data is therefore limited.
An example of current interest is “cosmic variance” in the predictions of temperature
fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation. The observed pattern of temperature
determines the correlation function C(θ) between the temperature fluctuations δT at two
different directions ~n1 and ~n2 on the sky separated by an angle θ:
C(θ) =
〈
δT (~n1)
T
δT (~n2)
T
〉
, (8.1a)
where 〈·〉 denotes an average over all directions ~n1 and ~n2 such that ~n1 · ~n2 = cos θ. This
correlation function can be conveniently expanded in spherical harmonics Pℓ(cos θ):
C(θ) =
∞∑
ℓ=0
2ℓ+ 1
4π
CℓPℓ(cos θ) . (8.1b)
The coefficients Cℓ so defined are the way the data from observations are are usually quoted
and are the objects of theoretical prediction.12
The probabilities of temperature fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation are
predicted from a spectrum of fluctuations implied by the initial quantum state. The proba-
bilities of these fluctuations are thus a detailed prediction of quantum cosmology that stem
directly from the initial condition. They are not conditional probabilities requiring other
information. The theory does not predict high probabilities for particular fluctuations in
temperature at particular locations on the sky. Rather, it predicts distributed probabilities
12See e.g., Ref. [25] for a detailed review.
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for these fluctuations (See e.g., Ref. [26]), or equivalently the probabilities for various values
of the Cℓ. The expected value and the standard deviation of this distribution is shown in
Figure 5. The width of the distribution is “cosmic variance”.
We cannot test these probabilistic predictions for the cosmic background temperature
fluctuations by measuring these fluctuations in a large number of identical cases. We have
only one universe and only one set of observed temperature fluctuations! An observed
distribution of Cℓ’s inside this “cosmic variance” would be confirmation of the theory of the
initial condition. An observed distribution outside it would be evidence against it. However,
observations will not distinguish two theories of the initial condition whose “cosmic variance”
both surround the observed distribution. Thus, for such probabilistic predictions we are
inevitably limited in our ability to test a theory of the initial condition.
More generally, as mentioned above, a theory of the initial condition can be tested only
through predictions whose probabilities are so near certain that we would reject the theory
if they were not observed. The sets of histories which lead to near certain predictions are
just a small set of those for which probabilities are predicted.
There are limits, therefore, to the process of inferring the initial state of the universe
from observation. If Cobs is the operator describing the entirety of our collective observations
then strictly speaking all we can conclude about an initial state |Ψ〉 is that it is not such
that
Cobs|Ψ〉 = 0 . (8.2)
That is not much of a restriction. For example, suppose that the projection Ppres. data
represents all our present data including our records of the past history. It is not possible
on the basis of either present or future observations to distinguish an initial state |Ψ〉 from
that defined by
|Ψ′〉 =
Ppres. data|Ψ〉
‖Ppres. data|Ψ〉‖
. (8.3)
Retrodictions of the past from present data and |Ψ〉 could differ greatly from those from
the same data and |Ψ′〉.13 But retrodictions are not accessible to experimental check and
therefore do not distinguish the two candidate initial states. The two initial conditions |Ψ〉
and |Ψ′〉 could differ greatly in complexity if the description of |Ψ〉 is short but that of
Ppres. data is long, and we may choose between these physically equivalent possibilities on
the basis of simplicity. The search for a theory of the initial condition must therefore rely
on the principles of simplicity and connection with the fundamental dynamical theory in an
essential way.
Why is it that the fundamental dynamical theory — the Hamiltonian of the elementary
particle system — seems so much more accessible to experimental test and so much easier
to infer from observational data than the theory of the initial condition? Strictly speaking
13Unlike classical physics, where the past can be retrodicted from sufficiently precise present data
alone, retrodiction in quantum theory requires present data and the initial condition of the system
in question. For further discussion see, e.g. [5], Section II.3.1.
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FIG. 5. Cosmic Variance. The heavy line on this figure shows the expected value of the multi-
pole moments of the two point correlation function defined by eq. (8.1) for temperature fluctuations
in the cosmic background radiation as predicted from the probabilities of these fluctuations aris-
ing from a simple theory of the universe’s initial condition. The dotted lines show the standard
deviation of the predicted distribution called the “cosmic variance”. Observations of our single
universe yield the correlation function and one particular distribution of observed multipole mo-
ments. These observations will not distinguish two theories of the initial condition whose “cosmic
variance” both surround the observed distribution. [Graph by J. Gundersen.]
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it is not. Were the Hamiltonian of the elementary particle system to vary on cosmological
scales — to be a function of spacetime position of the form H(x) — then inferring H would
be just as difficult a process as inferring the initial |Ψ〉. However, we assume the principle
that the elementary particle interactions are local in space and time. With that assumption
the Hamiltonian describing these interactions becomes accessible to many local tests on all
sorts of scales ranging from those accessible in particle accelerators to the expansion of the
universe itself. The problem of inferring the initial |Ψ〉 therefore is not so very different
from that of inferring H in making use of the theoretical assumptions. It is just that the
assumption of locality is so well adapted to the quasiclassical realm of familiar experience
that many more tests can be devised on small scales of a theory of H than we are ever likely
to find of a theory of |Ψ〉 on cosmological scales.
IX. CONCLUSIONS: THE NECESSITY OF LIMITS TO SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE
If the world is complex and the laws of nature are simple, then there are inevitable limits
to science. Not everything that is observed can be predicted; only certain regularities of
those observations can be predicted. Even given a theory, computational intractability or
observational difficulty may limit our ability to predict. In a world of finite observations,
there are inevitable limits to our ability to discriminate between different theories by the
process of induction and test.
Quantum cosmology — the most general context for prediction in science — exhibits
examples of all three kinds of limits to scientific knowledge. There are only a very few
predictions of useful probabilities that are conditioned solely on simple theories of dynamics
and the universe’s initial condition. There is a far richer variety of useful probabilities
conditioned on further empirical data that are the basis for most of the predictions in science.
There are some indications that the “no boundary” initial wave function is non-computable
in the technical sense of yielding non-computable numbers. That does not limit our ability to
extract predictions from the theory in principle, but may be an indication that predictions
sensitive to the topological structure of spacetime on small scales could be conceptually
challenging to compute. Finally, it is possible to exhibit different theories of the initial
condition with identical present and future predictions which can only be discriminated
between by an appeal to principles of simplicity and harmony with fundamental dynamical
laws.
We should not conclude a discussion of limits in science without mentioning that science
is useful because of its limits. Complex adaptive systems are successful in evolution and indi-
vidual behavior because they identify and exploit the regularities that the universe exhibits.
Scientific theories predict what these regularities are and explain their origin. Theories can
be used to estimate how tractable these predictions are to compute or practical to measure.
By comparing different theories induced from the same data an idea can be gained of the
reliability of our predictions. The existence of limits of the kind we have discussed therefore
does not represent a failure of the scientific enterprise. Limits are inherent in the nature of
that enterprise, and their demarcation is an important scientific question.
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